October 1967

EMO

U.S.- Canada Agreement, 1967

Canada EMO Officers' Briefing

- *— OCD and U.S. Defence*
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CANADA EMERGENCY MEASURES ORGANIZATION

EMO NATIONAL DIGEST

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The EMO NATIONAL DIGEST publishes six editions annually to provide current information on a broad range of subjects dealing with civil emergency planning. The magazine is published in English and French and may be obtained by writing to the Canada Emergency Measures Organization, Centennial Tower, 400 Laurier Ave. West, Ottawa 4, Ont.

In addition to publishing articles which reflect Canadian Government policy the Digest may also publish articles by private individuals on subjects of current interest to the emergency measures programme. The views of these contributors are not necessarily subscribed to by the Federal Government.

Director General: C. R. PATTERSON *Editor:* A. M. STIRTON

ROGER DUHAMEL, F.R.S.C.
QUEEN'S PRINTER AND CONTROLLER OF STATIONERY
OTTAWA, 1967

U.S. – CANADA AGREEMENT ON EMERGENCY PLANNING – 1967

Editor's Note:

"The first Canada-United States Agreement on co-operation in civil emergency planning was signed in 1951 and dealt only with civil defence matters.

By 1963 civil emergency planning had outgrown the earlier civil defence concepts, mainly directed towards population survival, to include emergency planning in most major fields of government activity. At that time authorities in both countries considered it desirable to bring the 1951 agreement into line with these new national civil emergency planning concepts and accordingly recommended a new agreement to their respective governments. This was approved by the Canadian Cabinet on October 17, 1963 and signed on November 15, 1963.

The 1963 agreement generally has provided a satisfactory framework for co-operation between civil emergency planning authorities in both countries. However, in recent months the U.S. authorities have approached their Canadian counter-parts to suggest that a revised agreement be drawn up which would provide more detailed guidance to the appropriate federal departments and agencies of the two countries to assist them in their joint planning. At the same time the U.S. authorities pointed out that experience had shown that the 1963 agreement did not in fact contain sufficient legal authority for their individual departments to proceed with co-operative planning of the type envisaged in that agreement. The Canadian officials concerned agreed to consider the drafting of a new agreement to meet these points and the first draft was prepared by the U.S. This draft was subsequently amended in accordance with Canadian recommendations and approved by the Government of Canada on July 6, 1967. It became effective on August 8, 1967.

The agreement takes the form of an exchange of the following notes:

Agreement on Cooperation Between United States and Canada on Civil Emergency Planning

The United States Ambassador

to the

Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs

SIR:

I have the honor to refer to the recent examination by the Joint United States-Canada Civil Emergency Planning Committee of the present state of co-operation in civil emergency planning between the two countries. The committee concluded that it would be mutually advantageous to improve this co-operation, and recommended that the 1963 United States-Canada Agreement on Civil Emergency Planning be revised in order to provide more detailed guidance to the appropriate government departments and agencies of the two countries to assist them in their consultations and exchanges of information on civil emergency planning (including civil defence) and the development where appropriate of co-operative arrangements and joint procedures for mutual assistance in the case of armed attack on either country in North America.

I am instructed by my Government therefore to propose an agreement which would implement the above conclusion of the Joint United States-Canada Civil Emergency Planning Committee and replace the existing United States-Canada Agreement on Civil Emergency Planning of November 15, 1963. Under this agreement the Governments of the United States and Canada will arrange for their appropriate departments and agencies, under the supervision of the United States-Canada Civil Emergency Planning Committee and in accordance with the Statement of Principles annexed

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hereto, to continue their consultations and co-operation on civil emergency planning (including civil defence) in order to achieve the maximum degree of compatibility feasible between emergency plans and systems of the two countries, and also to recommend to the United States-Canada Civil Emergency Planning Committee, where necessary and relevant, co-operative arrangements for mutual assistance in the event of armed attack on either country in North America. In implementing this agreement and its Statement of Principles both governments agree to co-operate to the maximum extent practicable and consistent with their respective jurisdictions.

Subjects relating to the determination of intergovernmental policy with regard to civil emergency planning will continue to be discussed by the two governments through normal diplomatic channels.

I also have the honor to propose that the United States-Canada Civil Emergency Planning Committee consist of the Director General of the Canada Emergency Measures Organization, a representative appointed by the Department of External Affairs of Canada, the Director of the Office of Emergency Planning of the United States, the Director of Civil Defence of the United States, and a representative appointed by the Department of State of the United States. The Secretariat of the Committee will be provided by the Canada Emergency Measures Organization, the Office of Emergency Planning and the Office of Civil Defence. The Committee shall meet at least once in each calendar year at such times and places as may be agreed upon.

It is further proposed that the committee shall, consistent with this agreement and the principles set forth in its annex:

(1) be responsible for supervising United States-Canada co-operative civil emergency planning and arrangements generally, including making recommendations as required to the two governments and providing guidance as required to their departments and agencies, concerning civil emergency plans, co-operation and mutual assistance. This would include reviewing and approving, or where necessary recommending to the two goverments, any co-operative civil emergency arrangements proposed by their respective departments and agencies;

(2) arrange for such joint consultation as required and establish such joint subcommittees and working groups as it considers necessary to discharge its responsibilities;

(3) facilitate, as far as possible and consistent with its powers, United States-Canada civil emergency planning and development of mutual assistance arrangements by adjacent states, provinces and municipalities along the international boundary;

(4) facilitate the exchange of information between the two countries on civil emergency matters.

If the proposals contained in this note and the annexed Statement of Principles are acceptable to your government, I have the honor to propose that this note and your reply to that effect shall constitue an agreement between our two governments on cooperation on civil emergency planning, to enter into force on the date of your reply. This agreement shall supersede that of November 15, 1963, and may be terminated by either government upon three months' written notice.

Accept, Sir, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.



Embassy of the United States of America,
Ottawa, August 8, 1967.

Attachment:
Statement of Principles.

Annex:

Statement of Principles concerning United States-Canada Cooperation on Civil Emergency Planning

The following Statement of Principles is intended to be used as a guide to civil emergency authorities in both countries.

Nothing in this agreement shall derogate from the application of Canadian law in Canada or of United States law in the United States. However, the authorities of either country may request the assistance of the other country in seeking appropriate alleviation if the normal application of law in either country might lead to delay or difficulty in the rapid execution of necessary civil emergency measures.

The agencies of both governments charged with civil emergency responsibilities will seek to ensure that in areas of common concern, plans of the two governments for the emergency use of manpower, material resources, supplies, systems and services shall, where feasible and practicable, be compatible; and that after an armed attack, measures supporting these plans relating to economic stabilization, priorities, allocations and other emergency economic controls will be consistent with this principle.

Each government will use its best efforts to facilitate the movement of evacuees, refugees, civil emergency personnel, equipment or other resources into its territory or across its territory from one area of the country to another when such movement is desired to facilitate civil emergency operations in either country. To this end:

(a) To the maximum extent permitted by their executive powers or national legislation, the Government of the United States and the Government of Canada will waive customs, immigration and other border-crossing requirements during a period of an emergency resulting from armed enemy attack. If it is not possible to waive certain requirements under existing legislation, both governments will use their best efforts to reduce to a minimum any delays which might otherwise be caused by border-crossing requirements. Both governments will also use their best efforts to ensure that civil emergency equipment, facilities and supplies may be used effectively and to mutual advantage in joint peacetime tests, preparations and exercises.

(b) The agencies of both governments charged with civil emergency responsibilities will consult to identify and to remove any serious potential impediments to cross-border assistance, emergency operations and the cross-border flow of commodities. Unresolved problems will be reported to the United States-Canada Civil Emergency Planning Committee for appropriate action.

In the event of an armed attack, and for the purpose of emergency relief, health and welfare services, each government will use its best efforts to ensure that those citizens or residents of the other country on its territory are treated in a manner no less favorable than its own citizens.

Each government will use its discretionary powers as far as possible to avoid a levy of any national tax on the services, equipment and supplies of the other country when the latter are engaged in civil emergency activities on the territory of the other, and will use their best efforts to encourage state, provincial and local authorities to do likewise.

When transportation, communication and related facilities and equipment which are subject to the control of one government are made available for emergency use to the other government, the charges to that government shall not exceed those paid by similar agencies of the government making these resources available. To this end mutually acceptable arrangements shall be worked out as necessary by the two governments.

In its emergency planning, each government will include provisions for adequate security and care for the personnel, equipment and resources of the other country entering its territory by mutual agreement in pursuance of authorized civil emergency activities. Such provisions will also ensure access to supplies necessary for their return.

Transportation and other equipment originating in one country but located in the other country at the onset of an emergency resulting from enemy attack may be temporatily employed under mutually agreed terms by the appropriate authority of the country in which the equipment is located.

Perishable or other readily consumable supplies located in one country at the time of an emergency resulting from enemy attack but owned by parties in the other country may be disposed of under mutually

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agreed terms by the appropriate civil emergency authorities of the two countries.

Each government will call to the attention of its state, provincial, local or other authorities in areas adjacent to the international border the desirability of achieving compatibility between civil emergency planning in the United States and Canada. For the purpose of achieving the most effective civil emergency planning co-operation possible between the United States and Canada, each government will, insofar as consistent with national plans and policies, also encourage and facilitate co-operative emergency arrangements between adjacent jurisdictions on matters falling within the competence of such jurisdictions.

Canadian Government Approval

Ottawa, August 8, 1967

No. 1766

EXCELLENCY,

I have the honour to refer to your Note of August 8, 1967 concerning revised proposals to govern co-operation in civil emergency planning between our two countries.

The proposals contained in your Note are acceptable to the Government of Canada and it is agreed that your Note and this reply thereto, shall constitute an Agreement between our two Governments which shall enter into force on the date of this Note.

Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.

Paul Martin

Secretary of State for External Affairs

His Excellency W. Walton Butterworth,
Ambassador of the United States of America,
Ottawa.

C.D. APPROPRIATIONS (U.S.)

Extract from "Status of the Civil Defense Program—January, 1967 issued by the U.S. Department of Defense, Office of Civil Defense, Catalogue MP 46.

F. Following are the appropriations to the Office of Civil Defense since the civil defense program became a part of the Department of Defense:

Fiscal Year	*Appropriation* (Millions)
1962	$207.6
	(49.6)*
1963	113.0
1963 Supplemental	15.0
1964	111.6
1965	105.2
1966	106.8
1967	102.1
TOTAL	$810.9

* Transferred from the former Office of Civil Defense and Defense Mobilization to OCD/DoD.

CANADA E.M.O. OFFICERS' BRIEFING

International Aspects of Emergency Planning

Editor's Note:

In September, 1966, the Canadian Emergency Measures Organization held its first seminar, for senior officers, on civil emergency planning. Presentations by recognized authorities on international and national geopolitics formed the fabric against which planning for emergency measures was presented to some 125 senior officials including ministers and deputy ministers of the federal government, provincial deputy ministers and senior government authorities from all Canadian provinces.

In May 1967, a second seminar was conducted for those who hold appointments in emergency measures organizations at federal and provincial level. The purpose of this two and a half day seminar was to update and stimulate these selected professional planners in the emergency measures field.

The first day was designed to present the current world situation together with the personal forecasts of the speakers. Throughout the program, audience participation was invited by either questions or expressions of opinion. Mr. J. B. Seaborn, of the Department of External Affairs, spoke on Canada and East-West relations. Professor W. L. Holland, Head of the Department of Asian Studies, University of British Columbia, gave his views on the foreign policy of Red China. Professor A. Bromke of the Political Science Department of Carleton University, then outlined his analysis of the foreign policy of the U.S.S.R. Mr. W. M. Johnson, Political Counsellor, United States Embassy, spoke on United States foreign policy. The day concluded with a discussion by Mr. John Gellner, Editor of the "Commentator" on the role and future of NATO.

The second day was organized to further develop the continental relationship in the civil defence context between Canada and the United States. The Canadian and United States tradition as a basis for co-operative planning was discussed by Professor P. V. Lyon, Chairman, Department of Political Science, Carleton University. Mr. R. C. Rasmussen, Director, Office of Civil Defence Staff College, then spoke on civil defence training developments and operations in the United States. Dr. William K. Chipman, of the Office of Civil Defense, Department of the Army, outlined the relationship of the Office of Civil Defense in the total defense of the United States. Mr. S. Brightwell of Operational Research, Department of National Defense, in his talk on the strategy and economics of intercontinental missile defense related it to Canada's position between two great world powers.

The third day was devoted to an examination of the impact of disaster on man and society. Professor R. Dynes, Co-Director of the Disaster Research Centre, Ohio State University, spoke on the societal and community problems in disaster. Dr. G. W. Baker, Staff Associate of the National Science Foundation, gave his views on both man and society in disaster. These discussions completed the sitting which allowed the Acting Director General, Mr. J. F. Wallace to present to the seminar the current national status of emergency planning and, in particular, the development of the Canada Survival Plan.

These seminars were held for persons who will be decision makers or principal advisers to decision makers, in the event of national crisis or a war emergency.

The seminars helped draw to their attention, in the minimum of time, the importance and continued need for civil emergency planning. Four of the talks are presented in this edition of the Digest.

Relationship of O.C.D. and U.S. Total Defense

by

Dr. William Chipman, Deputy Assistant Director of Civil Defense (Plans)
Office of Civil Defense
Office of the Secretary of the Army
U.S. Department of Defense

I should like to discuss with you today two related topics: The first is the role of the civil defense program in the strategic defensive posture of the United States. The second is an outline of that program, including the methods the Office of Civil Defense employs—working with State and local governments—to get those things done which add up to emergency readiness.

The civil defense program is an important part of the defensive posture of the United States. As President Johnson said in his 1965 Defense Message to Congress,

> "While confident that our present strength will continue to deter a thermonuclear war, we must always be alert to the possibilities for limiting de-

struction which might be inflicted upon our people, cities and industry—should such a war be forced upon us.

"Many proposals have been advanced for means of limiting damage and destruction to the United States in the event of a thermonuclear war. Shifting strategy and advancing technology make the program of building adequate defenses against nuclear attack extremely complex.

"Decisions with respect to further limitation of damage require complex calculations concerning the effectiveness of many interrelated elements. Any comprehensive program would involve the expenditure of tens of billions of dollars. We must not shrink from any expense that is justified by its effectiveness, but we must not hastily expend vast sums on massive programs that do not meet this test.

"It is already clear that without fallout shelter protection for our citizens, all defensive weapons lose much of their effectiveness in saving lives. This also appears to be the least expensive way of saving millions of lives, and the one which has clear value even without other systems. We will continue our existing programs and start a program to increase the total inventory of shelters through a survey of private homes and other small structures."

Secretary McNamara has also made a number of statements on the need for an effective civil defense system to complement other offensive and defensive systems. The quotations below are from his Military Posture statement to the Congress of February, 1965:

"Since we have no way of knowing how the enemy would execute a nuclear attack upon the United States, we must also intensively explore "defensive" systems as a means of limiting damage . . . The problem here is to achieve an optimum balance among all the elements of the general nuclear war forces (i.e., Strategic Offensive and Defensive Forces and Civil Defense), particularly in their Damage Limiting role.

* * *

"Although a deliberate nuclear attack upon the United States may seem a highly unlikely contingency in view of our unmistakable Assured Destruction capability, it must receive our urgent attention because of the enormous consequences it would have.

* * *

". . . Our analysis of this problem (damage limiting) . . . clearly demonstrates the distinct utility of a nationwide fallout shelter program in reducing fatalities, at all levels of attack.

* * *

. . . A transfer of resources from fallout shelters to other defensive systems would result in substantially less effective defense postures for any given budget level.

* * *

"Fallout shelters should have the highest priority of any defensive system because they decrease the vulnerability of the population to nuclear contamination under *all* types of attack."

The Secretary's statements above on the efficacy of a fallout shelter-oriented civil defense system are based upon damage-limiting analyses made by the Department of Defense, and statements to similar effect have been made on a number of occasions since, by Defense officials. For example, Secretary of the Army Resor said in a statement to a Congressional committee in March of this year,

"Civil Defense contributes significantly to Strategic Defense. Should deterrence fail, enemy weapons will be delivered in the United States. No defensive system can perform to perfection in the face of a large enemy threat. (But) the civil defense system will mitigate the effects of weapons which detonate on the United States."

At all events, the President, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of the Army, and the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff are agreed as to the importance of securing fallout protection for the population. The shelter-based civil defense system can be considered as a "weapons system," and it is in fact evaluated by the same cost-effectiveness techniques as are military weapons systems.

Such evaluations show that the shelter system stands upon its own feet in that it can save more lives in a nuclear attack at less cost than other defensive systems, and it is in addition a necessary complement to an anti-ballistic missile (ABM) system, should the decision be made to procure and deploy ABM defenses. This is because without adequate fallout protection,

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

DR. WILLIAM K. CHIPMAN

Dr. Chipman was born on 2 February 1928 in Newark, New Jersey.

He graduated from the University of Wisconsin in 1950 with a B.S. (Honors).

He then attended the University of Wisconsin Law School graduating L.L.B. (Honors) in 1954. He became a Doctor of Juridical Science at the same university in 1961. His dissertation was "Non-Military Defense for the United States—Strategic, Operational, Legal and Constitutional Aspects".

Dr. Chipman practised law in Madison, Wisconsin, from 1954 to 1957.

From 1957 to 1961 he was Law Fellow and part-time instructor, National Security Studies Group, University of Wisconsin.

From 1961 to 1963 he was Civil Defense Director for the State of Wisconsin and from 1963 to date he had been Deputy Assistant Director (Plans), Office of Civil Defense.

populations in cities defended by an ABM system could be attacked indirectly by ground-burst weapons detonated up wind of the defended area, with the resulting fallout then causing casualties among the unprotected city populations. Also, if ABM defenses should be deployed to protect United States missile installations, and these were nevertheless attacked, fallout protection would be required in downwind communities.

This brings me to my second major point—what is civil defense and how do we go about getting it? While I have just said that the civil defense program may be viewed as a weapons system—a defensive one—I must hasten to add that it is qualitatively different in a number of respects from the offensive and defensive weapons systems of the military services. This is of course because civil defense consists, in essence, of saving life and preserving property where the people and property are, in communities throughout the United States. One can not, therefore, buy civil defense by precisely the same methods one uses to procure a battery of artillery.

It may be convenient to consider the civil defense program in terms of both "hardware" and "software." By "hardware" I refer primarily to fallout shelter, the foundation upon which the civil defense system is built. Fallout protection is the foundation because any part of the United States—indeed nearly any inhabited part of North America—could receive fallout in amounts which would be lethal to unprotected persons, as a result of nuclear attack. What targets would be attacked, how the winds would be blowing, and what areas would therefore receive fallout cannot be predicted.

In the 1950's, the issue was how fallout shelters could be constructed. It then became clear, however, that the wrong question was being asked, since a great shelter resource exists in buildings large and small, due to the nature of their construction. The problem was primarily one of locating this existing protection.

Accordingly, the National Fallout Shelter Survey was launched by the Office of Civil Defense, and it has been followed by surveys of smaller structures and of the protection inherent in home basements. The results of these surveys are impressive.

The NFSS had, as of mid-April, 1967, located over 158 million shelter spaces in nearly 174,000 larger structures. Of these, the owners of some 98,000 buildings with space for over 96 million people have granted "licenses"—written permission to post the black-and-yellow Fallout Shelter sign and to stock the buildings with food, radiation monitoring kits, and other survival supplies.

Signs have been posted on facilities containing some 91 million spaces, and buildings with a rated capacity for 76 million people are stocked with an average of about 8 days of supplies.

The Small Structures Survey has located an additional 2.2 million spaces.

All of these shelter spaces are in facilities of construction heavy enough to provide a "protection factor," or PF, of 40 or greater. This means that persons in these shelter areas would receive 1/40 or less of the radiation they would be exposed to if they were completely unprotected—that is, 2½ per cent or less of the unprotected dose.

What would PF 40 protection mean in terms of life-saving should North America be attacked? U.S. Department of Defense studies indicate that in an attack against cities and military targets, with the weight of attack directed against cities, the fallout shelter resource *now existing and identified* would be directly responsible for saving up to 15 million people. If PF 40 protection were available to the entire population, up to an additional 20 million lives could be saved, under heavy attacks possible in 1975. Put another way, approximately 94 per cent of the survivors of blast and heat effects, who would otherwise die of fallout radiation, would survive with PF 40 shelters.

The proportionate contribution of fallout shelters in saving lives now and in future is much larger in the case of a lesser attack, whether intentional or accidental, or an attack not directed at cities.

The Defense Department studies also indicate that additional millions of lives could be saved through the use of protection of less than PF 40, particularly in the PF 20 to 39 range. This level of protection, while not meeting national standards for designation as public shelter, is still significant. In fact, it could save over 90 per cent of the blast and thermal effects survivors who would otherwise die due to fallout.

For this reason, the results of the Home Fallout Protection Survey, launched during the past year after extensive field tests, are of great interest. This survey of the protection inherent in existing home basements is based upon delivering or mailing a relatively simple questionnaire to householders. After answering questions about the size and nature of their house—in particular about the basement—they return the questionnaire to the U.S. Bureau of the Census. It is processed there by computer, and a booklet is returned to the householder, together with information on the PF of the best-protected corner and of other parts of his basement, plus advice on how to increase the PF.

The results of HFPS have, I believe, been most impressive in terms both of protection identified and of public response. We conduct the survey on a Statewide basis, after the State Governor has requested it. Surveys so far completed (in Rhode Island, Maine, Minnesota, Nebraska, and Utah) have located 205,000 spaces of PF 40 or better, as well as 4.5 million spaces of PF 20-39. (Eighty-five per cent of homes with basements provide PF 20 or better protection as they stand.) As I have just noted, these spaces provide a very significant level of protection, pending the development of PF 40 or better space.

HFPS surveys are now under way in Iowa, Kansas, West Virginia, and Colorado, and we expect to con-

duct them in 13 additional States during the balance of 1967.

We estimate that if we are able to survey most of the homes with basements in the United States—and basements become increasingly rare south of about the 37th parallel—we shall locate something like 7 million spaces of PF 40 or better, plus 68 million spaces of PF 20 to 39. (These are spaces available to the present residents of the homes, using an average of 3.5 persons per home.)

The potential home basement shelter resource is therefore large, but can we get people to fill out and return the questionnaires? The answer is yes—80 per cent of the householders who received the questionnaire in the first five States have taken the time to fill it out and return it to the Census Bureau. This extremely impressive response effectively demolishes the myth of "citizen apathy" with respect to civil defense. It proves that if people are asked to do something sensible in civil defense, they respond positively.

The surveys of existing fallout protection, therefore, have at very low cost identified a great deal of shelter —with not one dollar having been spent to construct shelter. It is also clear, however, that even when all existing shelter has been identified—including that in structures built during the next several years—there will still exist a substantial portion of the population without adequate fallout protection both at their places of work and at home. This is due primarily to the maldistribution of existing shelter, the preponderance of protection in larger buildings being in the central parts of cities. Also, as I have mentioned, home basements are few in our southern tier of States.

It is possible, however, to incorporate fallout protection in new structures at little or no cost, if one knows the proper design techniques. We call these "slanting" techniques, and they consist of such things as providing a little extra weight overhead in central areas of schools or other buildings; specifying solid concrete block around the central areas rather than hollow blocks or tile; and taking care in siting doors and stairways.

Accordingly, the Office of Civil Defense has trained some 12,000 architects and engineers in these slanting techniques, and we provide professional advisory service, from the universities in the States, for other architects who request it. Also, we shall commence field-testing a system next month which we think will result in the "slanting" techniques being applied on a wide scale.

This system is based upon a wide-spread network of reporters who make it their business to find out about proposed new buildings as early as possible—frequently before design has started. Their reports are published daily by the F. W. Dodge Corporation for the use of suppliers, construction contractors, arthitects, and engineers.

We shall be testing a system under which, as soon as a proposed new structure is reported, personalized letters will be sent to both the owner and his architect. These letters will point out the need for additional shelter space and the fact that protection can be incorporated inexpensively when "slanting" techniques are applied early in the design state. The letter to the architect will also offer technical advice on "slanting," should he desire it. The test will cover some 3000 new buildings in seven States, and will start next week. We hope that this system will result in a very substantial increase in the shelter inventory, over and above that which would result from normal construction practices.

It seems clear that even with intensive efforts to identify all existing space, and to encourage the incorporation of shelter in new construction, there will remain substantial areas in the United States where PF 40+ fallout shelter will be lacking for the foreseeable future—for example, much of the South, especially in rural counties with few home basements and where the population is static or declining, and there is thus little new construction. The shelter problem could be solved here only by special-purpose construction. This is not proposed at the present time, but even in such areas, a great deal could be done in periods of crisis to improvise additional fallout protection, and we have a program—which I shall discuss in a minute—to let the people know how to do this. In addition, we are pilot-testing systems to locate the best locally available shelter in southern States where there is insufficient PF 40+ protection, and we have found so far that there appears to be a substantial amount of PF 20-39 space in smaller buildings in the South.

So much for shelter, the "hardware" base for the civil defense program. What about the people and organizational aspects of the program—what we may call "software"?

In principle, the problem is simple. For existing shelter—of whatever PF—to be used with maximum effectiveness, these things must occur:

- Each citizen must know where he should go and what he should do in case of nuclear attack, to have the greatest chance for survival, and he must act on this knowledge. Where he should go may be a public shelter, or his home basement, if he has one. What he should do may include taking necessary supplies to a public or home shelter area, or improvising additional fallout protection. It assuredly includes staying in the best protected space available until radiation has decayed to the point where it is safe for him to leave shelter. (This could be a day or two, a week, or as much as two weeks.)
- Local governments must be prepared to conduct emergency operations. That is, the population would need warning; police, fire, and other local forces must be prepared to assist the people to move to public shelters; and sheltered populations must be supported. For example, public shelters would need both shelter managers and trained radiological monitors; where fallout levels permit-

ted, it might be necessary for fire forces to combat fires; or it might be necessary to move people from one shelter to another. The people, whether in public shelters or home basements, would require emergency information, on the fallout situation and other matters essential to survival. Medical and welfare support would be required, particularly during the shelter-emergence period.

It is clear, therefore, that what is needed is not fallout shelter alone, but rather shelter plus the supporting systems required to ensure maximum performance by the total civil defense system. Secretary McNamara alluded to this need for an integrated civil defense system, based on fallout shelter, in his 1964 Military Posture statement to Congress:

"An effective Civil Defense Program requires two major elements: a nationwide system of fallout shelters, properly equipped and provisioned, to protect our population from the fallout effects of nuclear attack; and planning and organization of capabilities essential to the effective use of this system, including the ability to carry out essential postattack emergency operations."

As the basis for building such a civil defense system, with the aim of securing emergency readiness in localities throughout the United States, we have embarked upon the Community Shelter Planning (CSP) program. The primary purpose is to produce local shelter-use plans, as a basis for advising both the public and local government forces on what to do in case of emergency.

The first step is to match all of the local population to the best fallout protection reasonably accessible to them, whether this be public shelter or home protection. CSP information materials are produced—usually in the form of maps and instructions—and are distributed to all households. These include advice to people in areas not served by public shelters on means of improvising fallout protection.

The CSP process also provides for identifying the local deficit of PF 40+ shelter and for undertaking a local action program to deal with it—arrangements, for example, to encourage the inclusion of fallout protection in new schools, public buildings, or private structures. In addition, local government chief executives issue directions to their department heads, to assure that their emergency plans are revised to support the community's plan for the use of fallout shelter—so that the police department plan, for exemple, provides for assisting citizens to move to public shelters.

To carry out the CSP program, we are relying for technical work upon the profession best equipped to handle problems involving people and their environment, the professional city planners. In larger communities, we contract directly with a local planning agency. In smaller communities, where the problems of matching people and shelter are less complex, we provide assistance by an OCD-funded State CSP Officer.

Local civil defense directors are of course closely involved in the CSP process, as are local chief executives, as well as other key officials and citizens of the area.

We have found that the CSP program makes sense to local government officials and is enthusiastically endorsed by them. For the first time, they see what can be done concretely to meet their responsibilities to their citizens. The problem is not the nebulous and forbidding one of, "Be prepared to preserve lives and property in case of nuclear attack." Rather, it is the much more understandable, credible and concrete one of, "Be ready to get your people into the best fallout protection available to them, at such-and-such shelters, and see that your local government forces are ready to assist the people to get there and to survive after they arrive." In short, the Community Shelter Plan acts as a catalyst and unifying framework for local civil defense programs and organization.

Another—and allied—necessity is for local governments to be able to exercise direction and control in an attack emergency. To do this, the key officials should have available a protected control center, with the necessary communications to public shelters and local police, fire, and other forces, as well as to other levels of government and to broadcast stations. We call this an Emergency Operating Center, or EOC. Protected space for an EOC can often be found in the basement of an existing city hall or county courthouse, and it is desirable to have police or fire dispatchers operate there on a day-to-day basis.

Over 2500 local governments, containing about 40 percent of the population, now have or are developing EOC's, and more are starting to develop them every month, for the most part by modifying suitable areas in existing structures.

OCD has developed guidance on how to organize, staff and operate an EOC with the key officials of local governments. This includes detailed suggestions on staffing and duties, on maps and displays, and on message forms and routing.

This guidance was developed through laboratory tests involving the key officials—mayors, chiefs of police, fire chiefs, civil defense directors—of three cities or counties. We found that once these key officials had had four of five hours of training on EOC procedures, they were able to deal extremely rapidly and accurately with emergency problems relating to their city. These included such problems as a number of people seeking admittance to a shelter already filled to capacity, or —during the fallout period—fire, food or medical problems affecting people in public shelters.

The local officials who were presented with such problems as these—at rates up to 600 messages per hour—were nearly unerring in sorting out those demanding first attention and in making prompt decisions. Thus, in as little as 8 or 10 minutes, the local chief of police might decide—after checking with the shelter expert in the EOC—to order a police vehicle to lead

people outside a shelter already filled to other public shelters 6 or 8 blocks away with space still available. Or the fire chief or the local health officer would decide whether, in light of the fallout situation, they could move fire apparatus or medical personnel to deal with problems in public shelters. In short, the local professionals in emergency action seem to find little problem in directing actions in response to assumed nuclear attack emergencies in their jurisdictions.

Our experience in the three test localities, and in sixteen more field-test communities, was that not only did local officials learn how to operate efficiently in an EOC—knowledge of value in natural as well as nuclear disasters—but for the first time, in most cases, came to realize that there was in fact a great deal they could and should do to assist their citizens. The civil defense program, and their emergency roles as local executives, in other words, suddenly made a great deal of sense.

OCD has accordingly undertaken what we call the Emergency Operations Simulation Technique (EOST) program. Using the universities under contract to OCD to provide on-site civil defense training in each State, and in cooperation with State and local civil defense agencies, EOC exercises are conducted in selected jurisdictions. Operating in their EOC, local officials deal with attack problems relating to their jurisdictions —their people, the shelters they have, and the local police, fire, health-medical, or welfare forces or resources available to them. First reports are that these EOST exercises are getting extremely good reception, with local civil defense programs and planning securing the whole-hearted support of mayors and their chiefs of police and other department heads who have participated in one of these exercises.

In addition to actions taken during the warning and in-shelter periods, we are convinced that actions taken by local governments during a period of increased international tension could result in saving additional millions of lives, should an attack occur. For two years, we have had "Increased Readiness" guidance in the hands of State and local governments. This comprises common-sense checklists of things to do during a crisis, such as progressively increasing the staffing of local EOC's, or undertaking accelerated training of shelter managers and radiological monitors.

We are about to publish an improved and expanded version of this guidance, covering a number of new functional areas, such as emergency public information, fire, police, welfare, and schools. For example, one of the emergency public information actions is to re-disseminate to the citizens CSP maps and instructions, on "where to go and what to do" in case of attack.

We believe that these checklists will be of great use to local executives, should another crisis develop. I base this statement on some Increased Readiness exercises conducted by OCD Research with the mayors and key officials of five cities, including New Orleans, Detroit and others. They found that the existing Increased Readiness guidance provided the sort of crisis checklist they needed and, as I have said, the 1967 version will be much more complete.

OCD also has in the final stages of development an Increased Readiness Information System (IRIS), which we expect to deploy during the coming summer. This provides for local governments nominated by the States to report key Increased Readiness actions taken each day, by using a checklist message form. This covers some 20 significant actions, such as partially manning the local EOC, re-disseminating CSP information to the public (on "where to go/what to do"), or commencing accelerated training.

This information is telephoned to the State each evening, and it is summarized and forwarded by States and Regions during the night. The summaries provide a basis for briefing National, Regional, and State executives the next morning. In a field test last November we found no problems in securing and processing the IRIS data, and we therefore anticipate that the system should prove both useful and practical when deployed to 1000 or 1200 representative local jurisdictions.

There are a host of other jobs to be done in communities throughout the United States to attain emergency readiness—in addition to the community shelter planning, EOC development, and Increased Readiness planning I have just discussed. For example, local governments are responsible to move Federally supplied fallout shelter supplies into shelters. They must recruit and then arrange for the training of shelter managers and radiological monitors. They should establish a network of radiological monitoring stations with telephone communications to the EOC, and they need a Radiological Defense Officer there to analyze the data. They should see that as many adults as possible take our standard courses on personal and family survival and on medical self-help.

How does OCD set about helping States and local jurisdictions to get these things done? The foundation of our Federal-State-local civil defense program is the Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950, as amended. This provides that civil defense is the joint responsibility of the Federal Government and of the States and their political subdivisions.

To carry the civil defense program into effect, OCD provides (1) leadership and guidance; (2) 50 percent matching funds for salary and other expenses of all States and of qualified local government; and (3) certain fully-funded programs, such as the National Fallout Shelter Survey, the Home Fallout Protection Survey, the Community Shelter Planning program, and the bulk of the training support needed by local governments.

The nature of the civil defense program is such that readiness must be developed "on the ground" in local jurisdictions throughout the country. This, plus the

joint responsibility laid down by statute, means that local and State governments must decide to act, and must appropraite funds, before Federal assistance —especially monies to match the local funds—can be effective.

The primary requirement for OCD assistance is the submission of an annual local civil defense "program paper." This specifies in detail the work to be done in some 75 areas, (e.g., stocking public shelters, training radiological monitors, etc.). For each item, the locality states what its total requirement is (e.g., stock 21,000 shelter spaces); what has been accomplished to the start of the fiscal year (July 1); what remains to be done; and how much they plan to complete during the year. A semiannual report of progress as of December 31 is submitted, while the program paper for the next fiscal year includes a report of progress during the last half of the year preceding.

The program paper/progress report forms are computer-prepared, with a new form being sent each six months to each participant, reflecting the last progress data submitted by it. The primary purpose of this approach is to reduce the clerical work load for local CD offices, but the computer handling also allows OCD to prepare summaries of the program paper data, by States and Regions and for the entire country.

Some 4200 local governments, including over 86 percent of the population, submit program papers, (as well as all 50 states). The program papers provide a basis for Regional and State assistance to those local governments which appear to need it most. Also, it may be of interest that completed program papers and progress reports require the approval of local or State chief executives before submission to OCD.

In summary, I think it is fair to say that the civil defense program in the United States is one which makes sense to our citizens and makes sense to elected and appointed officials of government at all levels. We believe that it is a practical and credible program because it is based upon the use in emergency of the resources which exist today—the fallout protection existing in buildings small and large, the existing communications of local governments and of the broadcast industry, and—most important of all—the men and women of existing governments, together with their skills, know-how, and equipment.

We stress—as you do in Canada, I believe—that "civil defense" is in fact nothing but civil government responding to an extraordinary emergency—natural disaster or nuclear attack. This concept is based upon several premises:

- That there is a substantial in-place capability for emergency operations, such as 250,000-plus paid police officers, and 1.3 million paid and volunteer fire fighters; and that while these existing forces might need some citizen augmentation, they are the nucleus for emergency operations.
- That local civil executives are familiar in detail with their jurisdictions, and are thus best qualified to direct and control emergency operations.
- That existing civil governments have all extraordinary powers required for emergency operations.
- That the military can and should plan and be prepared to support civil governments on an as-available basis by assisting in emergency operations, but that military units would not attempt to govern (i.e., exercise "martial rule") unless local civil government were destroyed or overwhelmed. Military commands are in fact hard at work developing such contingency plans for support of civil authorities by available military units, with over 200 officers engaged in such planning, most of them in the offices of the States Adjutants General.

As our community shelter planning and EOC exercise programs reach more local jurisdictions, we are seeing real understanding and acceptance of these premises, and of the concept that civil defense is government in emergency—grappling in very concrete ways with the hazards and emergencies which a nuclear attack upon the United States would create. We hear less and less of notions which had some limited currency in the earlier days of civil defense, for example, that local civil defense directors would somehow "take over" (presumably from the mayor) in time of emergency, and would conduct operations with a "civil defense organization" which was in some way apart from existing civil government forces. We also encounter more rarely a somewhat vaguer concept on the part of a few local elected officials, to the effect that Someone (often "the Army") will in some manner "take over".

We think that the U.S. civil defense program is both feasible and acceptable for these reasons:

- Those actions required of citizens and their gov- the possibility of nuclear attack; specifically, it could save millions or tens of millions of lives. Scarcely anyone appears to reject the program because it does not purport to guarantee survival for everyone; people are much more realistic than that.
- It is consistent with the normal framework of American society by virtue of its emphasis on the dual-purpose use of existing resources and skills.
- It provides significant life-saving potential against ernments can be and are understood, and are of a type that can in fact be carried out.

While we still have a substantial way to go, we believe we are on the right track. We are proceeding with what we believe is a logical, orderly, and economical program, to guard against that unlikely but by no means impossible event, nuclear attack. ▲

The Future of NATO

by

John Gellner, Editor of the "Commentator"

The latent crisis in NATO finally came to a head in early 1966, bringing on the withdrawal of France from the alliance's military organization, but the origins of the difficulties go back much farther. They first cropped up in 1958. Then, a number of circumstances arose to call into question the until then undisputed, sole U.S. leadership of the alliance: The greatly enhanced Soviet nuclear capability demonstrated by the flights of SPUTNIK I. and of the first ICBM, and the consequent lessening of the credibility of the U.S. nuclear deterrent. The coming to power in France of General de Gaulle. The French decision to go ahead energetically with the organization of an independent nuclear force.

To de Gaulle it seemed clear that the United States could go on leading the other 14 in NATO only if it co-ordinated its world-wide policies with those of its allies—or at any rate with the two allies who also had responsibilities the world over, and at the same time were aspiring nuclear powers, Great Britain and France. To demand this outright, as de Gaulle did, was to ask for a fundamental change in American practice. Up to then, the United States had been consulting with its allies on policy matters, but only if they touched NATO directly, and even then not always. Outside the NATO area, Washington pursued its own policies, without asking anybody's leave. These policies were sometimes contrary to the interests of other NATO partners. (U.S. policy in the Suez crisis is an outstanding example.)

That this was not a viable modus operandi was, of course, recognized also by others than de Gaulle. Field-Marshal Lord Montgomery, for instance, said in a 1958 address to the Royal United Service Institution in London: "The truth of the matter is that the United States and its European allies have completely failed to work out a common policy on a global basis . . . We cannot continue in this way; it is just crazy. The NATO countries must agree on a common policy, and this must be practiced on a world-wide scale. The 1949 concept must be broadened. It is ridiculous to suppose that we can be allies to the north of a certain parallel, and at the same time pursue our contradictory national policies to the south of the same line".

What de Gaulle did was to translate in his usual blunt fashion a fairly commonly held idea into action. On 17 September 1958, he wrote to President Eisenhower that (to quote from a paraphrase of the exchange in a later U.S. State Department "Summary of Events") "the world situation no longer justified delegating to the United States the power to make decisions concerning free world defense. He therefore called for a tripartite organization on the level of world policy and strategy, to take joint decisions on political questions affecting world security and to establish and put into effect strategic plans of action, notably with regard to the employment of nuclear weapons". The United States declined. De Gaulle renewed his bid in another letter to President Eisenhower, of 10 June 1960, and met with another rebuff. "It is clear", says the already quoted State Department document, "that the French Government throughout this period wished to establish tripartite arrangements that went far beyond the consultations the United States considered possible in the light of its own responsibilities and free world interests".

The United States may have been right in refusing to conduct its foreign policy in committee. In fact, because of constitutional obstacles, it probably could not have acceded to the French plan of a directing triumvirate even if it wanted. On the other hand, it was equally clear that from 1960 onwards France did not go along with allied grand strategy, but that she tailored her policies to the requirements for, and the handling of, her own, independent nuclear deterrent. There should have been no doubt in anybody's mind that France would leave the NATO military organization as soon as her nuclear force was along far enough to give her a modicum of protection.

It *was* thus possible to keep France in the military alliance. This was not done either because the United States did not consider the concessions that would have had to be made acceptable, or because the organization worked too sluggishly to carry out reforms of a fundamental nature. Such sluggishness is characteristic of

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MR. JOHN GELLNER

Mr. Gellner was born in Trieste in 1907, the son of a Czech medical officer in the Austro-Hungarian Army.

In 1930 he graduated from the Masaryk University, Brno, Czechoslovakia as a Doctor of Law. He served in the army from 1930 to 1939, then practised law in Brno until the capture of the city by the Germans in March, 1939. He fled first to Italy, then to the United States. At the outbreak of the war, he came to Canada to enlist. From 1940 to 1958 he served in the R.C.A.F. as a navigator, pilot, and in various staff and instructional positions. He was awarded the Distinguished Flying Cross, and retired as a Wing Commander.

Since then, he has been a free-lance journalist and lecturer. He was foreign correspondent for "Saturday Night" in Europe for a year. Mr. Gellner was appointed editor of "Commentator" in 1964. He has written numerous articles in newspapers and magazines in Canada, the United States, Germany and Switzerland. His special interests are military affairs and Eastern Europe.

NATO. This is perhaps understandable if one considers how big the alliance is and that unanimity must be achieved among so many. Paul-Henri Spaak, a former Secretary-General of NATO, deplored this shortcoming, saying: "A sense of fatality seems to smother us. We know what must be done. We even succeed in expressing it quite well. But for one reason or another we are not able to translate our will into action. Where are the men of clear mind and resolute will that the West needs desperately to save its precious inheritance?"

This rather lengthy summary of what happened and why it happened was necessary, because, strangely enough, the reasons for the 1966 crisis in NATO have not been clearly enough understood in North America. Something that was predictable—and expected by many—has been presented as a whim, or even spitefulness, on the part of one man, de Gaulle. In fact, the French move, though harsh and certainly embarrassing for the alliance, was good policy from France's standpoint.

Today, the French withdrawal from the military organization of NATO is an accomplished fact. There is no point indulging in recriminations. All energy should rather be devoted to keeping NATO together, politically as an alliance of 15, militarily as one of 14, with France a formally unconnected but fairly sympathetic associate.

To achieve this end, three fundamental problems of the alliance must be tackled:

The problem of the mission of NATO.
The problem of alliance strategy.
The problem of nuclear sharing in the alliance.

These are all very involved issues; they must be examined in depth. In this resume, it will only be possible to state in every case the present situation, and perhaps list the principal considerations bearing on the issues.

As to the mission. NATO is still in the main only a regional military alliance for the defence of Europe. Despite a vague promise contained in Article II. of the North Atlantic Treaty and some strong urging on the part of some of the partners, and in particular Canada, NATO has not developed beyond its original, narrow aim. A purely military alliance is inwardly strengthened when the military threat it is supposed to counter is grave; if it is considered remote, interest in the alliance wanes. The latter has been happening to NATO in the last few years, as the Soviet threat to Europe has, in the eyes of many, appeared to be lessening.

U.S. strategy has always been NATO strategy, because practically all of NATO's strength has always been provided by the nuclear power of the United States. Present U.S. strategy is geared to a "flexible response under central (i.e. American) control". This has now been also formally accepted by the other 13 in the NATO military organization. Not all are happy about it, though. Especially Germany is worried about a strategy that envisages at first a delaying action, if possible without any resort to nuclear weapons, a delaying action which would of necessity be fought on German soil.

There is no nuclear sharing, properly speaking, in NATO. The United States has untrammeled control over the nuclear weapons protecting the alliance, except for the comparatively few in British hands. There is only "nuclear consultation", in the 10-member Nuclear Defence Affairs Committee, and in the 7-member Nuclear Policy Committee. More ambitious plans for nuclear sharing, that for a Multilateral Nuclear Force (MLF) for instance, have now all been shelved, mainly because they are in the way of a Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, which in turn can only ensue from an arrangement between the United States and the Soviet Union. Here again, some of the major continental allies, Germany and Italy above all, are not at all satisfied with their almost complete exclusion from any kind of control over the decisive weapons of the alliance.

What NATO needs is a new sense of unity. The shock administered last year by France might in the end prove to have been salutary, but only if the allies become determined now not to allow another to occur. It need not, if the problems of NATO are tackled in earnest, and ultimately resolved in a way that will satisfy all the partners. ▲

Soviet Foreign Policy in the 1960's

by

Prof. Adam Bromke, Carleton University, Ottawa.

In the 1960's the gap between the letter of Marxism-Leninism and the actual Soviet conduct in the international sphere has widened steadily. This has posed a serious dilemma for the Kremlin leaders.

The growth of power of the Soviet state and the spread of Communist revolution throughout the world have, of course, never been quite identical. However, under Lenin, and especially under Stalin, they became harmonized to a very considerable extent. Stalin evolved a fairly coherent synthesis between Communist ideology and Russia's national interests. The great sacrifices which the Russians had to undergo during the period of rapid industrialization in the 1930's were explained in terms of building a better society and strengthening the defence of their country. The fight against the German invader was at the same time

depicted as a struggle against fascism and the "Great Patriotic War". Soviet territorial expansion at the end of World War II was presented as the success of Communist revolution in new countries as well as the recovery of ancient Russian lands; and the Communist régimes in Eastern Europe were established by resorting to both subversion by local Communists and Soviet military pressure. Finally, the activities of the international Communist movement and Soviet foreign policy became carefully synchronized. The Comintern, and later the Cominform, were turned into virtual adjuncts of the Soviet government. When in 1948 Tito's Yugoslavia dared to follow an independent course, it was promptly expelled from the Communist ranks.

The dual character of Stalin's foreign policy was also evident in relations with the Western powers. The protection of Russia's national interests served as the basis for the doctrine of "peaceful coexistence" with the capitalist countries. Whenever met with a superior force —such as in Western Europe in the late 1940's and in the Far East in the early 1950's—Soviet expansion and Communist revolutionary activities were halted and the principles of peaceful coexistence were revoked. Thus conceived, the doctrine was in no way in conflict with the interests of international Communism, however. For Stalin, peaceful coexistence was clearly a tactical device. He merely recognized what was called "relative stabilization of capitalism", and he believed that at some stage capitalist countries would enter into a new crisis, opening up opportunities for the further spread of Communism. Stalin expected that the final triumph of Communism would be accomplished in a fashion similar to its successes in World War II. He thought that the ultimate contest between the two systems would most likely take the form of a violent clash between the U.S.S.R. and the U.S., and he grimly prepared his country for such an eventuality.

Following the death of Stalin and the ascendancy to power of Khrushchev in the mid-1950's, the harmony between Russia's national interests and the objectives of international Communism has become gradually impaired. With the advent of the nuclear era, Khrushchev found it necessary to modify Stalin's doctrine of peaceful coexistence in one important respect. He realized that, in the new situation, to try to spread Communism by war would be impractical, for it would expose the Soviet Union to the risk of nuclear annihilation. Thus, he elevated peaceful coexistence from tactics to strategy, and renounced an all-out military struggle against capitalist countries. Yet, Khrushchev's doctrine did not amount to abandoning Stalin's synthesis, for it strove to promote simultaneously the growth of power in the Soviet state and the spread of Communist revolution throughout the world. It merely said that the latter goal would be accomplished by means other than a nuclear war.

Indeed, in the late 1950's and the early 1960's, Khrushchev tried various means which, short of nuclear confrontation, would bring about new Communist gains at the expense of the capitalist countries. He turned to direct pressure in what he considered as vulnerable spots in the West, and, at the same time, strove to encircle it by fomenting unrest and seeking allies in the underdeveloped areas in the world. In the years 1958-1961 he kept the Berlin issue open, and in 1962 tried to improve dramatically the Soviet position vis-à-vis the United States by placing rockets in Cuba. In the same period Khrushchev attempted to exploit the various crises in Asia and Africa—for instance in Algeria, Laos or the Congo; and he cultivated various developing countries—such as Egypt, Ghana or Indonesia—by offering them extensive economic and military aid. On the whole, however, Khrushchev's offensive against the West was unsuccessful. By meddling in the different Asian and African crises, the Russians scored no spectacular successes. With the exception of Cuba, they failed to induce any developing countries to join the Communist bloc. Moreover, faced with a determined opposition from the Americans, Khrushchev did not win any significant concessions in Berlin, and suffered a severe loss of prestige in the confrontation with the U.S. over Cuba.

Meanwhile, Khrushchev found himself faced with growing opposition from Mao's China. The Chinese rejected Khrushchev's version of peaceful coexistence.

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PROFESSOR ADAM BROMKE

Professor Bromke is Associate Professor of Political Science and former Chairman of the Soviet and East Europe Studies Program, Carleton University.

Professor Bromke was born in Warsaw, on July 11, 1928 and received his secondary education there. A member of the political underground, he served in the Warsaw Uprising of 1944, and was captured by the Germans. He later made his way to the West and served under the British Command with the Polish Forces in Italy.

In the post-war years, he studied in Britain and Canada, obtaining his M.A. degree from the University of St. Andrews and his Ph.D. from both the University of Montreal and McGill University.

Subsequently, he has pursued an academic career and has taught in various universities in Canada and the United States.

Professor Bromke has specialized in Eastern Europe politics. In 1960-1961 he was a Research Fellow at the Russian Research Centre Harvard University, and since 1963 has been Managing Editor of the Canadian Slavonic Papers. In recent years, he has travelled widely in Eastern Europe.

Dr. Bromke has contributed numerous articles to specialized journals on international affairs, including Foreign Affairs, Journal of International Affairs, Revue de la Defense Nationale and International Journal.

He is editor of the "Communist States at the Crossroads" (Praeger, New York, 1965), and author of "Polish Politics—Political Idealism Versus Political Realism", soon to be published by the Harvard University Press.

They clung to the Stalinist view that a final clash between Communism and capitalism would take the form of a military struggle; and they expected the Soviet Union to continue the policy of direct pressure against the West. Khrushchev's pleas that such a policy would expose Russia to a mortal danger fell upon deaf ears. After the Soviet retreat in the Cuban crisis, the Chinese openly turned against the Russians, accusing them of a betrayal of Communism. Furthermore, the Sino-Soviet split undermined Soviet influence in the international Communist movement. Various Communist parties—such as those in Albania or Indonesia—sided with the Chinese. The others—such as those in Rumania or Italy—exploited the situation to emancipate themselves from the shadow of both Moscow and Peking. Khrushchev's frantic efforts to restore Communist discipline proved to be of no avail. Polycentrism spread throughout the Communist ranks everywhere.

Thus, in the final years of Khrushchev's rule in the U.S.S.R., the harmony between Russia's national interests and the objectives of international Communism was effectively disrupted. Khrushchev was faced with a painful choice. He could try to appease the Chinese by adopting a more bellicose posture towards the West, even if it increased the possibility of an all-out war against the United States. Or he could break with Red China and reduce the danger of a nuclear holocaust by seeking accommodation with the Americans. In short, he had to give priority either to the protection of the Soviet state or to the spread of Communism throughout the world. Khrushchev clearly chose a policy of *rapprochement* with the West. In 1963-64, he abstained from aggravating the tensions with the United States in Berlin, Cuba, or Vietnam; and, indeed, agreed to some steps—as, for instance, the nuclear test-ban treaty—which considerably improved relations between Moscow and Washington. At the same time, Khrushchev accepted conflict between Russia and China as inevitable, and moved to stage a final showdown between Moscow and Peking.

The replacement of Khrushchev by Brezhniev and Kosygin in the fall of 1964 has brought about no major change in Soviet policy. Brezhniev and Kosygin neither abandoned Khrushchev's interpretation of peaceful coexistence, nor revived tensions in the former areas of friction with the United States—Berlin or Cuba. When new crises erupted, as on the Indian subcontinent in 1965 or in the Middle East in 1967, the Russians likewise showed a good deal of moderation. Even in Vietnam, where since 1966 the conflict has considerably escalated, they acted with restraint. They have increased their aid to the North Vietnamese Communists, but at all times maintained extensive diplomatic contacts with the United States. Negotiations between Moscow and Washington to conclude a nuclear non-proliferation treaty have continued uninterrupted.

There has also been no major change in Sino-Soviet relations. The Russians went out of their way not to aggravate the dispute—they refrained as much as possible from polemics and even reiterated offers of negotiation—but offered no major concessions to the Chinese. Moreover, when by 1966 China suffered several reversals in its foreign policy, and, with the launching of the "cultural revolution", chaos spread throughout the country—Moscow was quick to seize the opportunity to discredit Peking and improve its own position in the international Communist movement. Their renewed efforts to stop the spread of polycentrism in the Communist ranks were unsuccessful. Not only the Rumanian and Italian Communists, but also the North Korean and Japanese parties, have asserted their independence from both Moscow and Peking.

A novel element in the Brezhniev-Kosygin course, even going beyond Khrushchev's efforts at *a rapprochement* with the West, has been the emphasis on the normalization of relations with the countries bordering the Soviet Union. In Western Europe the Russians exploited the rift between Paris and Washington to improve relations with France. In the South, Soviet relations with India have remained close, while those with Turkey, Iran and Pakistan have improved considerably. In the East, diplomatic exchanges with Japan, and across the North Pole with Canada, have been greatly intensified. All in all, the climate of a *détente* has been advanced in relations between the U.S.S.R. and most of the Western countries.

The basic continuity between Khrushchev's foreign policy and that of Brezhniev and Kosygin, has not been accidental. This is because the dilemma with which Khrushchev was faced in the late years of his rule has been inherited by his successors. The Stalinist synthesis between Russia's national interests and the revolutionary goals of international Communism has been irrevocably broken. The new Soviet leaders, like Khrushchev in the early 1960's, have to make a choice between either one or the other—they cannot have both. It seems that Brezhniev and Kosygin have opted for the protection of the Soviet state at the expense of world-wide Communist revolution.

The decline of revolutionary messianism and its replacement by the traditional Russian nationalism does not mean, of course, that the Soviet Union no longer poses a potential danger to the West. The U.S.S.R. is one of the two nuclear super powers with global interests, and as such—even if it would completely get rid of the Communist ideology, which is not yet the case—it will continue to exert its weight in various conflicts in the world. Yet the present transformation of the Soviet Union into a state like any other—except bigger and stronger—is undoubtedly a hopeful sign. By removing the barrier of ideological prejudices, it might well facilitate an accommodation between Russia and the West. ▲

Societal and Community Problems in Disaster

by

Prof. Russell R. Dynes, Co-Director, Disaster Research Center,
Department of Sociology, Ohio State University.

While I am going to talk descriptively about community response to natural disaster, let me initially suggest four obstacles to thinking about planning for disasters.

1. The term "disaster" possesses certain semantic traps. As it is commonly used, it somehow connotes that such events produce a severe disruption and disjuncture in human behavior. In assuming that a severe disruption occurs, plans are often made to institute "extreme" measures to control people.

2. Planning for disasters also often assumes a passive population. There is nothing in the literature, however, on reactions to natural disaster or to military attacks which suggests that people react passively to such events. On the contrary they become actively involved in the emergency and rehabilitative activity.

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PROFESSOR RUSSELL R. DYNES

Dr. Dynes has been a faculty member of Ohio State University since 1951.

He was born in Ontario, Canada, and later attended the University of Tennessee where he received degrees of B.A. and M.A. in 1948 and 1950 respectively. He came to Ohio State in 1951, became an assistant instructor later that year, and an instructor in 1952. He received his Ph.D. degree from Ohio State in 1954, became an assistant professor in 1956, associate professor in 1959 and professor in 1965.

Dr. Dynes has also held a number of short-term positions with other universities and institutions. He was an instructor at the University of Tennessee from 1948 to 1950, a research associate at the Ohio State University Research Foundation from 1953 to 1957, a co-director of a study of industrial migrants in the Ohio Atomic Plant Area during 1954/55, and project director of a small community development study involving education changes in the transitional community in 1955/56.

During 1964/65, he was a senior Fulbright lecturer at Ain Shams University in the United Arab Republic, and he was also a Research Fellow at the American Research Center in Egypt.

Currently, Dr. Dynes is Co-Director of Ohio State's Disaster Research Center.

He is the author of a number of papers dealing with the Sociology of Religion, Social Organization and Social Change, and his latest work, of which he is the co-author, is "Social Problems: Dissensus and Deviation in an Industrial Society". Active in professional affairs, Dr. Dynes is a Fellow in the American Sociological Association, the Religious Research Society Association, the Middle East Study Association and he was elected a member of the Faculty Council of Ohio State University in 1963.

3. Planning is sometimes based upon false assumptions concerning human reactions to disaster agents. For example, often elaborate preparations are made to prevent looting while experience has shown that looting is practically non-existent. Or preparations often are made to cope with problems of personal disorganization, while experience has shown this is minimal.

4. The response of communities to disaster agents is often characterized as being chaotic, wasteful and disorganized. While there is an element of truth to this, such a description of behavior would also fit much of "normal" social life.

While I plan to concentrate primarily on Canada and the U.S., let me make one comment on cross-national differences in reactions to disaster. The more significant difference among societies is not in terms of how peoples react to disasters but how societies and their sub-units organize their response to cope with disaster. For example, a society which has a more centralized government will obviously involve greater national governmental action in the local community than in those societies with greater local autonomy. In Canada and the U.S., it is primarily the local community which is the acting entity in disaster response. These communities can be seen as problem solving entities. Such communities may need "outside" help, but such help is most frequently accepted on their own terms. If such communities are problem solving entities, a disaster event can be seen as being productive of new problems to be solved and the occasion when old problems may be intensified. At the same time, the event is destructive of resources which may be needed in such solutions.

It can be suggested, however, that, in many ways, a community becomes a much more efficient problem solving entity during the emergency period than it is during normal times. The reason for this is that during the emergency period there is agreement—a consensus—on the importance and priority of values. Certain activities become crucial, i.e., care for casualties, while others becomes irrelevant, i.e., economic activity. Thus, resources can be concentrated upon these more critical values, and some of them can be displaced from other activities which have now become irrelevant. Too, manpower can be drawn into emergency activity from the surplus created by the cessation of irrelevant activity. In addition, individuals within the community are encouraged to participate in emergency activities by an expansion of their citizenship role. The normal minimal obligations of citizenship within the

community now "expand" to include active participation within the emergency system. With the concentration of activity and resources on what are commonly agreed to be critical community problems and manpower augmented by this "more positive" obligation to help among community members, the local community, in effect, becomes a more rational problem solving entity than it was when its goals were diverse and its citizen involvement minimal.

In this context, it is useful to view community organizations as being problem solving entities and to observe how different types of organizations become involved in disaster activities and how their disaster activities relate to their pre-disaster ones. For example, some community organizations have tasks within the emergency period which are essentially continuous with their pre-disaster activities. Others, however, have new tasks. In addition, certain organizations maintain a similar set of social relationships from the "normal" to emergency period while others develop a completely new set of relationships. Using these dimensions of tasks and structure, when one cross classifies, four different types of organizations are revealed which typically become involved in disaster activity. This is illustrated in the figure below.

		TASKS	
		Regular	Non-regular
STRUCTURE	Old	Type I (Established)	Type III (Extending)
	New	Type II (Expanding)	Type IV (Emergent)

Type I is an established organization carrying out regular tasks. This is exemplified by the official members of a city police force directing traffic around the impact zone after a tornado has struck a community.

Type II is an expanding organization with regular tasks. These are more often the result of community or organizational planning. The organization exists on "paper", but the core of its exists prior to the disaster event. This would be illustrated by Red Cross volunteers running a shelter after a hurricane, supervised by a permanent Red Cross official.

Type III is an extending organization which undertakes non-regular tasks. This is illustrated by a construction company which utilized its men and equipment to dig through the debris and assist during rescue operations.

Type IV is an emergent group which becomes engaged in non-regular tasks. An example is an *ad hoc* group made up of the city engineer, county CD director, a local representative of the state highway department and a colonel from the Corps of Engineers who coordinate the overall community response during a flood.

These groups and organizations, then, constitute the range of organized activity within the community in attempting to cope with the impact of a disaster agent. There is a definite pattern, however, to the sequential involvement of these organizations and groups in disaster activities. The sequence appears to be as follows:

Type I organizations are initially involved in any community emergency. There is a public expectation that they will become involved and therefore they are notified. There are also organizational expectations of becoming involved, either on the basis of previous activity or by the definition of the emergency relevance of the organization. Because of their existing structure, these organizations can mobilize quickly and efficiently. They have mechanisms for assessing the demands which will be made on the organization. If the demands made on the community can be handled primarily by Type I organizations, the activating event tends to be treated as a "localized" community emergency.

Type II organizations become involved next. They are organizations with latent disaster resources. They are in a state of readiness and both the community and their own expectations move them towards mobilization and involvement. These organizations, however, generally have only a small, central, permanent cadre of workers during non-emergency periods. Also, while these organizations have emergency responsibility, their normal time activities are not directly related to existing or current community emergencies. It is clearly expected, however, that these organizations will become active in a different way during a disaster. In one sense, they can be seen as the nucleus with standby functions to be activated for anticipated needs in large scale disasters. When the disaster occurs, the pre-emergency cadre provide a name and a core of permanent workers for the "new" structure of expanding organization. These organizations tend to be mobilized in the event of anything but a most localized emergency,

but their mobilization is slower and usually more difficult than for Type I organizations.

Type III organizations are probalby the most numerous of all groups involved in major disasters. Often they do not stand out as clearly because their members frequently work in conjunction with or intermixed with Type I and Type II groups. Thus, a citizen's band radio club may help man or provide the operators and equipment for a local CD communications network or a church group may staff and operate a shelter under nominal Red Cross supervision. The participants, however, act primarily on the basis of their pre-disaster organizational affiliations. In fact, they become involved because of their organizations' formal or informal participation within the emergency system. In other words, their participation in the community emergency response is the result of their pre-disaster group membership.

Some Type III organizations may become involved at somewhat the same time as do Type II organizations. In general, however, most of them become involved later since community expectations of their involvement is less institutionalized. These organizations become involved primarily because they are "community oriented" and want to help or because they possess certain resources which become relevant in the emergency. This means that their participation tends to be delayed until there are tasks identified which they can undertake or until their resources become relevant for some task within the emergency social system. A major factor is the "speed" of their involvement is the time it takes to make an assessment of the ways in which these organizations can be of assistance.

Type IV groups are by far the most difficult to conceptualize since they have no pre-disaster existence and when the emergency is over they tend to dissolve. They are usually small and ephemeral groups which bear no name. Often they develop no clear cut boundaries; yet they emerge in large scale disasters and play and important role in the overall collective response.

Type IV groups tend to become involved last. In part, this is true because their emergence is dependent upon the involvement of the other three types of organizations. While Type I organization might be able to cope with a localized emergency situation, the increased scope of the disaster event tends to assure the involvement of Type II and III organizations. With the involvement of all three types of organizations, there develops a lack of coordination among these. There also may be no overall control of the various activities taking place. Additionally, there may be a lack of information during the inventory period. All of these tend to be new tasks which have not been anticipated and therefore cannot become the basis of an expanding Type II group nor are they tasks which are felt to be within the previous experience of extending organizations (Type III) in the community. In other words, there are new tasks, and to deal with them, new groups emerge.

This classification provides some understanding of the involvement of the range of community organizations during the emergency period. Such a classification allows the identification of problems which relate to a particular class of organization. For example, it is possible to anticipate and plan for the "needs" which give rise to emergent groups. Can these activities be institutionalized and not be left to "chance" emergence? Also, Type II organizations seem to be particularly problematic. If cadre organizations are to be used in disaster activities, what are the processes which are evoked by expansion of personnel? Since these organizations are the major mechanisms whereby volunteers are utilized, it is necessary to think out the complex problems of the use of volunteers in an emergency period. In addition, the group which emerges in widespread disasters to coordinate the varied activities is often composed of individuals who have a variety of skills as well as formal positions within the community. The actual composition of such an emergent group is often difficult to predict on the basis of pre-disaster knowledge and/or plans. Perhaps this is due to the fact that disaster activities require a different, somewhat unique, basis of authority within the community. Some people, notably some political leaders, are often reluctant to accept a "new" basis of authority and others have accepted it by default. In any case, these are some of the problems and unknowns in the actual social processes which occur subsequent to disaster. There is no doubt that prior planning can facilitate problem solving of the local community, but planning must be based on the knowledge of the basic social processes which occur in fact in such situations. ▲

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